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R216Developmental Psychology:
A Precursor of Moral Judgment
in Human Infants?
Human infants evaluate social interactions well before they can speak, and
show a preference for characters that help others over characters that are not
cooperative or are hindering.
P. Jacob1 and E. Dupoux2,3
The field of developmental psychology
has advanced tremendously over the
past thirty years, progress that is well
illustrated by the recent paper of
Hamlin et al. [1]. Pioneering work of
Elisabeth Spelke, Susan Carey, Rene´e
Baillargeon, Karen Wynn and many
others has shown that, far from being
immersed into William James’ world of
‘‘booming and buzzing confusion’’,
preverbal infants have highly
structured expectations about the
world: they parse the world into
discrete and countable objects with
properties like solidity and continuity
through space and time [2,3]. Infants
further distinguish between inanimate
and animate objects: the former are
governed by the laws of Cartesian
physics; the latter are self-propelled
and infants take them to be rational
agents of goal-directed behaviors
[4,5]. These discoveries have been
made possible by two major steps:
first, the assumption that cognitive
development is based not on
general-purpose principles of
associative learning, but rather
on genetically determined,
domain-specific acquisition systems
[6–9]; and second, the emergence
of astute experimental designs,
capable of probing preverbal infants’
behavioral reactions in response to
their perception of simple versus
complex, old versus new, or possible
versus impossible, events — providing
insight into their perception, memory
and expectations [10].
So far, the social and moral world of
preverbal infants has remained pretty
much terra incognita. Past studies by
Piaget [11], Kohlberg [12] and others
have described human infants as being
self-oriented or egocentric, or only
responsive to adults’ authority. But
these studies used either informal and
anecdotal observations or verbal
reports, which are not readily usable
before the age of three years old.
Using two nonverbal experimental
techniques, Hamlin et al. [1] have now
shown that infants can evaluate
a geometrical, cartoon-like agent
involved in either helping or hindering
another character who is trying to
climb a hill (Figure 1). More specifically,
a preference-choice technique
shows that 10-month-old and even
6-month-old infants display a
preference for the helping agent
over the hindering one, and
a violation of expectation paradigm
shows that the 10-month-olds are
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Figure 1. The nonverbal experimental technique used by Hamlin et al. [1].
(A) Social interaction events shown to infants. The climber (red character) attempts to climb
the hill twice, each time falling back to the bottom of the hill. On the third attempt, the climber
is either bumped up the hill by the helper (yellow character, left panel) or bumped down the hill
by the hinderer (blue character, right panel). In the violation of expectation task (B), infants’
looking times are measured for two events: the climber moves from the top of the hill to sit
with the character on the right (left panel) or the left (right panel). In the choice paradigm,
infants are presented with two toys, the helper and the hinderer, and are asked to choose
one. (Reproduced with permission from [1].)
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R217more surprised to see the climber
display a preference for the hinderer
over the helper.
These results mesh well with the
fast growing evidence that moral and
social cognition is based on so-called
‘core systems’ — computationally
specialized systems which process, in
an automatic and unconscious fashion,
evolutionarily relevant social and
emotional information [13]. First,
adults make very quick moral
judgments, but, as Haidt [14] has
shown, they often find themselves
utterly dumbfounded when asked for
explicit justifications. Secondly, as
Blair [15] has argued, individuals who
fail to empathize with the emotional
distress of others, develop
psychopathic behavior and are
impaired in moral evaluation. Thirdly,
as emphasized by Mikhail [16] and
Hauser [17], moral judgments may
require the representation of the
intentional structure of social
interactions, the computation of
which is based in turn on deeply
unconscious abstract principles.
Finally, animal studies provide some
evidence for the existence of
complex social behaviors such as
punishing cheaters [18] and
comforting distressed conspecifics
[19], which in humans may reflect
moral judgments.
Does thismean that preverbal infants
entertain moral thoughts? As Hamlin
et al. [1] rightly put it, their experiment
merely demonstrates that 6-month-olds
display preferences for agents who
help, rather than hinder, some
unrelated third-party. Awareness of the
work in other domains of cognitive
development, however, should make
us suspicious of the claim that there
is a single cognitive foundation for
human moral cognition. Indeed, in the
case of numerical cognition, there is
not a single preverbal core system
for numbers, but at least two: one
system for tracking a small number of
objects, and another system for
evaluating large quantities or amounts
of stuff [20]. Note that neither of
these systems is genuinely numerical
in the sense of number theory.
Similarly, one could propose that
morality rests not on one, but on
several, core systems, none of which
is intrinsically moral.
In the situation used by Hamlin et al.
[1], there are at least two potentially
confounded factors. The hindering
agent is both frustrating the climber’sintention and also potentially harming
him by harshly pushing him on the
slope. Similarly, if and when the
helping agent promotes the climber’s
goal after the hindering agent has
performed his negative act, then the
question arises whether the helping
agent might also provide comfort to
the climber. In the abstract of their
paper, Hamlin et al. [1] tend to
confuse two different social
contrasts: helping versus hindering,
and comforting versus harming.
These two dimensions are
dissociable: one can hinder the act of
another agent so as to prevent him
from harming himself. Conversely,
one can help another agent
perform a harmful act on himself.
In addition, these two dimensions
may elicit different emotions:
hindering an agent’s act causes the
agent’s anger; harming a patient
causes the patient’s distress. If so,
then there are reasons to think that
these two dimensions are processed
by two separate systems. Further
research is needed to elucidate the
number of separate social
dimensions that are relevant for
human infants.
Before closing, we would like to
comment on the developmental
difference found by Hamlin et al. [1]
between the 6-month-old and the
10-month-old infants. They found that
the 6-month-olds showed a preference
for the helper over the hinderer, but
were not more surprised to see the
climber approach the hinderer
as opposed to the helper. The
10-month-olds reacted in both tasks.
The authors imply that there could be
a developmental trend whereby
infants would first use their own
first-personal emotional responses in
order to evaluate social interactions
involving unrelated parties. Only later
do they become able to represent
the social evaluation of an agent by
another character who was either
helped or hindered by the agent’s act.
We suggest that the lack of emotional
cues in the climber’s responses to
either the helper’s positive act or the
hinderer’s negative act might explain
the fact that 6-month-olds failed to
display more surprise when they saw
the climber join the hindering agent
than the helping agent. At least, it
is worth testing whether adding
emotional cues on the part of the
climber might enhance the surprise
of 6-month-olds.In brief, the findings by Hamlin
et al. [1] raise several fascinating
issues: is there a unique capacity
for social evaluation or several?
What is the link between the ability
to evaluate helping vs. hindering
agents and culturally acquired moral
beliefs and norms regarding social
cooperation? Are these systems
partly learned on the basis of early
social interactions? Or are they
genetically pre-wired? Are non-human
animals able to discriminate
between helping and hindering
agents too?
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Bacterial pathogens must suppress ho
research shows that the Pseudomonas
directly targeting plant transmembrane
perception.
Cyril Zipfel and John P. Rathjen
An old saw in plant pathology states
that most plants are resistant to most
pathogens. An important aspect of this
phenomenon is host recognition of
immutable pathogenmolecules, known
as PAMPs (for pathogen-associated
molecular patterns), by pattern
recognition receptors (PRRs). Only
a few plant PRRs are known; the
plasma-membrane-localised
leucine-rich-repeat receptor kinases
(LRR-RK) FLS2 and EFR recognise the
bacterial PAMPs flagellin and EF-Tu, or
their peptide epitopes flg22 and elf18,
respectively [1]. If PAMP recognition
is not evaded or suppressed, host
immunity is elicited and pathogen
growth is halted. Importantly, Zhou and
colleagues [2], in a recent issue of
Current Biology, now show that the
bacterial virulence factor AvrPto
targets PRRs directly to suppress
PAMP recognition in host plants.
Bacterial pathogens secrete a suite
of virulence ‘effector’ proteins through
a specialised type III secretion system
(TTSS) [3]. The model pathogen,
Pseudomonas syringae pv tomato
DC3000 (Pto DC3000), secretes more
than 30 effectors, and mutants
defective in the TTSS machinery (‘ttss’
mutants) are not infectious. However,
mutants lacking individual effector
genes display subtle or no virulence
phenotypes, suggesting that effectors
act redundantly or additively.
Nevertheless, several effectors have
been shown to inhibit or suppress plant
immune responses and to contribute to
virulence [3,4]. Despite these advances,
in most cases the effectors’ targets
in the plant cell are still unknown,Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales, Departement d’Etudes
Cognitives-Ecole Normale Supe´rieure,
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,
29 rue d’Ulm, Paris 75005, France. 3Maternite´
Port-Royal, Faculte´ de Me´decine Port
Royal-Cochin, APHP, Universite´ Rene´rPto Targets the
st defences to cause disease. New
effector protein AvrPto does so by
receptor kinases involved in bacterial
reflecting our generally poor knowledge
of plant immune-signalling pathways.
Plant immunity comprises several
layers of recognition of which
PAMP-triggered immunity (PTI) is the
first. A secondary layer involves
recognition of effectors by dedicated
resistance (R) proteins. To infect
a given host, microbes must either
avoid PTI or suppress it through the
actions of effectors. In turn, some
plants have evolved resistance (R)
proteins to detect these effectors,
causing effector-triggered immunity
(ETI), which is often accompanied by
a form of cell death known as the
hypersensitive response (HR). The
dynamic interplay of these two
forms of immunity as the host
struggles to recognise elusive
pathogens reflects the evolutionary
pressures of these intimate
relationships [5,6].
The Pto DC3000 effector protein
AvrPto is a small triple-helix protein
that, like several other effectors, is
targeted to the plasma membrane by
N-myristoylation [7]. Although AvrPto
contributes demonstrably to pathogen
virulence, it was identified initially by its
ability to induce ETI in tomato plants
carrying an effector recognition
complex composed of the protein
kinase Pto and Prf, a canonical R
protein of the nucleotide binding-LRR
family [6] (Figure 1). AvrPto interacts
directly with Pto in tomato cells.
However, AvrPto contributes to
virulence in tomato lines lacking Pto
and/or Prf [8–10]. Strikingly, ectopic
overexpression of AvrPto in the plant
model Arabidopsis thaliana restores
growth of a Pto DC3000 ttss mutant to
almost wild-type levels [11], suggestingDescartes, 123 boulevard de Port-Royal,
F75014 Paris, France.
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DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2007.12.043that AvrPto suppressed PTI to
a sufficient level to allow growth of this
strain. Moreover, transgenic
expression of AvrPto suppressed the
expression of genes encoding defence
and secreted cell-wall proteins and
also inhibited callose deposition
induced by a Pto DC3000 ttss mutant.
AvrPto was therefore proposed to
suppress cell-wall-based plant
defences. However, several
subsequent publications reported
that AvrPto seems to work very early
in PTI, because AvrPto expression in
Arabidopsis and Nicotiana
benthamiana inhibits several early
markers of PTI [12–14]. Interestingly,
AvrPto expression inhibits early
responses induced by several
PAMPs [13,14]. Taken together, these
results showed that AvrPto must
target signalling components
directly at, or immediately proximal
to, recognition events at the plasma
membrane. The major question,
however, remained; how does it
do it?
Until recently, no biochemical
function could be assigned to AvrPto.
Recent structural work suggests that
AvrPto acts as an inhibitor of Pto by
occluding the kinase catalytic cleft
[15]. Somewhat confusingly, the
kinase-inhibition activity of AvrPto
is dispensable for elicitation of
Pto–Prf-mediated resistance [15],
suggesting that an alternative protein
kinase target(s) might underlie the
virulence activity of AvrPto. Based on
homologies between the kinase
domain of Pto and those of FLS2 and
EFR, Zhou and colleagues [2]
postulated that AvrPto might interact
with and inhibit these LRR-RLKs.
Indeed, AvrPto interacts with FLS2
and EFR both in vitro and in vivo
when expressed ectopically in plant
cells. Furthermore, AvrPto inhibits
autophosphorylation of FLS2 and
EFR in a dose-dependent manner.
Thus, AvrPto is an inhibitor of PRR
kinase domains (Figure 1), consistent
with its plasma-membrane localisation
and variety of suppression activities.
